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ABSTRACT
In this paper, the relationship between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows and
democracy levels of upper-middle income nations using three different measures of
democracy is investigated. An empirical analysis across the years 2010 through 2018 was
conducted, using the democracy indicators and data from the United States Agency for
International AID (USAID). These democracy indicators are the EIU Democracy Index,
Polity5, and IDEA Global State of Democracy Indices. The importance of this research
revolves around the benefits of FDI inflows and how countries may capitalize on these
benefits. Additionally, FDI has increased rapidly in the past 20 years and democracy has
wavered, possibly establishing a new relationship. The results found no statistically
significant relationship between democracy and FDI inflows. Instead, GNI per capita was
discovered to have a robust and significant correlation with FDI inflows. The policy
implications are that countries seeking FDI should investigate ways to increase national
income first, as it is seen as an attractive quality for a firm looking to invest abroad.
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INTRODUCTION
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and democracy have a long-standing connection,
demonstrated through prior research. There are several, independent determinants of FDI and
democracy, which causes the relationship to vary throughout existing literature. The
correlation between the two is generally seen as positive, meaning higher democracy levels
(the independent variable) is generally seen with higher levels of FDI inflows (the dependent
variable) (Busse, 2003). This correlation is seen in different areas of the world, strengthening
the relationship (Asiedu and Lien, 2011). There are several possible reasons for this
correlation, including democratic countries have more lucrative investment opportunities for
entities looking to invest abroad, separate from their own economy. Additionally, it could
result from the presence of corruption in non-democratic nations, where it is significantly
more prevalent.
FDI has grown significantly since the late 1980s alongside benefits for the receiving nation.
The most prominent benefit of FDI for a country is economic growth, as in increased FDI
inflows for a country results in economic growth (Hansen and Rand, 2006). Economic growth
is vital for many countries, particularly developing countries where organic growth is difficult
due to a poor financial system, lacking infrastructure, or substandard education. High
economic growth ultimately culminates in higher standards of living, which further
perpetuates economic growth. Another benefit of receiving FDI is qualitative: knowledge
(Pradhan and Singh, 2008). One reason for poor economic growth in developing nations is the
lack of knowledge to provide goods and services needed by developed nations. When
multinational firms invest in less developed countries, they provide capital and knowledge of
how to efficiently and effectively manufacture the good or provide the service. This
knowledge spreads from the single firm to the local economy, allowing other companies to
utilize those same techniques.
This research will accomplish numerous objectives. Prior literature has found a connection
with democracy and FDI, though that research has focused on older data sets and/or select
geographical regions (Africa, European Union etc.) and has not considered worldwide FDI.
Additionally, there has not been research on the most recent data points for any of the
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democratic measures chosen, where democracies around the world are receiving different
scores. For example, although not in the sample, the year 2020 saw significant declines in
nearly every country in terms of the democracy rankings. In the prior five years, there has also
been a slight decline in worldwide democracy measures, contrary to a slight, steady increase
in the several years prior to that. It is important to continuously update existing research as
new data comes in, especially with a variable such as democracy, which can fluctuate
tremendously over a period of time. Also, the increase in FDI for the entire globe has been
astounding in the past 30 years, making data and research performed 20 years ago susceptible
to the new data and their findings incorrect. Much of the prior literature was published well
over ten years ago, which leaves an opportunity for new connections to be made.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Definitions
Democracy and FDI are different in several ways; perhaps most noticeable as democracy is
not an objective variable, while FDI is. Democracy is a form of government which has existed
for thousands of years and yet difficult to define. Dalton et al. (2007) mentions several
definitions which are widely accepted, from democratic governance to the outcomes of
freedom and liberty for all citizens. Furthermore, Ronald Dahl “equate(s) democracy with the
institutions and processes of representative government” (Dalton et al., 2007). On countries
attempting to become democratic, O’donell (1994) asserts “governmental policies and the
political strategies of various agents must embody the recognition of a paramount shared
interest in democratic institution building.” This concept of sharing a mindset and objective of
democracy applies to actively functioning democracies as well. Democracies are the opposite
of authoritarian regimes. However, the line between democracies and authoritarian regimes is
a blurry one at best, in part due to the fact democracy cannot be defined precisely.
Democracies heavily influence the countries in which they are practiced, even becoming
interwoven within the culture of some nations. This influence is exerted everywhere from
foreign policy to the economy. One niche aspect which is seen heavily is FDI, which
combines foreign policy and the economy. FDI, described in the next paragraph, is important
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to countries as it yields many benefits. One of its determinants, as established in literature
below, is democracy.
FDI is one of the primary ways firms in one country invest their resources into another
country. Described by Duce (2003), FDI is the investment by an entity in an economy which
is not their own for the purpose of acquiring a long-term interest in a firm within the other
economy. FDI has many positives for both the outside investor and the recipient country. The
investor can diversify their investments, capitalize on profitable ventures outside of their
home economy, and overall provide the potential for higher returns compared to an investor
who is restricted to their own economy. As for the investee, the inflow of additional sources
of capital allows for ample business growth, perhaps higher than what is normally expected.
Furthermore, the economy of the investee is able to benefit as a whole, as more capital allows
for businesses to experience a greater number of potential benefits. FDI has been growing at a
steady rate as it becomes an increasingly popular medium to invest in foreign markets
(Blonigen, 2005). Many countries are progressively becoming more attractive for inward FDI
as their host countries are saturated with investment. Many investors, particularly domestic
ones, tend to jump quickly at new opportunities in an effort to maximize return on investment
(Kim, 2011).
FDI Determinants
FDI has numerous determinants, many of which have been established in research focused on
various regions of the world. These factors influencing FDI fall into several different
categories, which include developing and developed countries, different regions, and various
socioeconomic factors unique to each country. To begin, Schneider and Frey (1985) find that
in 54 developing countries with complete data, high per capita gross national product (GNP)
and bilateral aid from Western countries were determined to be two of the leading factors
which correlated with high FDI inflows in years 1976, 1979, 1980. These two factors, when
favorable, indicate a robust economy that has the capability to absorb FDI inflows and
experience the benefits to the highest degree. Schneider and Frey (1985) conclude increased
bilateral aid specifically from Western countries was being receptive to democracy, as
opposed to accepting communist aid, potential making these countries more desirable for
Western nations to invest in. This research was conducted through four separate models,
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although the politico-economic was found to be the most accurate as it accounted for more
overall and relevant factors, suggesting FDI determinants fall into both political and economic
factors. The politico-economic model combines the variables from both the economic and
political models; specific variables included real GNP per capita, GNP growth, inflation rate,
balance of payments deficit, political stability, and bilateral aid received from
Western/communist nations.
In similar findings while studying 19 Latin American countries between the years of 1990 and
2010, Sanchez-Martin et al. (2014) found a stable and open government contributed
significantly to inflows of FDI. Along with Schneider and Frey (1985), they find FDI
determinants to be a mixture of political and economic factors in a given country, as firms
looking to invest in other countries must consider the whole nation while deciding where to
directly invest funds. Significant factors that were identified consist of government stability,
investment profile, law and order, short-term debt, and trade-openness. Governments see FDI
inflows as a benefit to their country and their economy in particular, as it can have many
positive effects. Although referencing the United States and the individual states, Chintrakarn
et al. (2012) found that states with higher FDI inflows from other nations in terms of gross
state product had less income inequality, as the two variables are negatively related. While
this relationship may not hold up in developing countries, it is crucial to note that inward FDI
has this ability, as well as other economic benefits. It is of note these political and economic
factors can vary across countries, particularly those in different economic stages (such as
developing countries compared to developed ones).
Economic FDI Determinants
Although FDI historically has been concentrated in countries with developed economies and
the ability to “absorb” FDI inflows in a useful way, increasing amounts of FDI is going to
developing areas. A prime example which Asiedu (2002) points out is the 32 sub-Saharan
Africa she observes, along with 39 non-sub-Saharan African countries for comparison during
the time period of 1970-1999. Sub-Saharan African countries which possess better
infrastructure and yield higher returns on investment do not see greater amounts of FDI
inflows, contrary to the rest of the world, signifying potential issues firms have investing FDI
into these countries. These potential issues center around the inherent riskiness of investing in
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sub-Saharan-Africa compared to other areas of the world, a result of the governments in
place. To further that idea, Alfaro et al. (2004) ran an empirical analysis using cross-country
data and discovered economic growth and FDI are not strongly correlated, however countries
encompassing developed financial systems experience substantial gains from FDI. The lack of
overall relationship was attributed to the limit local conditions place on the FDI inflows,
where undeveloped economies cannot properly utilize the capital in an effective way.
Developed financial systems are a result of a developed economy, where the flow of surplus
cash is provided to cash deficits which allows for increased business investment. Financial
systems allow for an efficient allocation of resources within an economy, increasing overall
economic growth.
Political FDI Determinants
Political factors perhaps have the most impact on determining FDI inflows. While economic
characteristics are absolutely considered, many economic components are a result of political
decisions by the government. Additionally, political elements are much more likely to be
enduring compared to their economic counterparts. One example of a lasting political decision
which directly impacts economies is trade agreements. In the case of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), Büthe and Milner (2008) notice countries who are a member have
higher FDI inflows to those who are not after performing a statistical analysis of 122 countries
over a period of 30 years, from 1970 - 2000. To further the hypothesis of trade openness
equates to higher FDI inflows in a developing country, Büthe and Milner (2008) discovered
countries involved in a greater amount of preferential trade agreements also have a greater
quantity of FDI inflows, calculated as a percentage of GDP for the receiving country. The trait
of an open economy is desirable for potential FDI investors, particularly when the country’s
economy is still developing and has ample room to grow.
Furthering the political and economic connection, Mudambi et al. (2013) conclude that
stricter economic regulation (a political decision) often leads to more corruption within the
government and decreased FDI inflows in an analysis of 55 countries across four separate
periods of time: 1985-86, 1990-91, 1995-1996, and 1999-2000. In that article, it was
important to note corruption was not an exogenous factor in the model. Instead, corruption
was a direct result of stringent regulation, with lower FDI inflows also being a result of
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overregulation. Broadening on political factors in the form of government control, Pan et al.
(2014) research the effects of government ownership and control on a corporation’s outward
FDI after analyzing 594 firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange using company reports from the year 2010. They find subsidiaries of governments
are at less risk to potential adverse conditions presented in the country which they invest in.
This connection could be due to the greater knowledge and resources a firm with government
ownership has, where the government wishes to ensure financial prosperity. This implies that
countries such as China and Saudi Arabia will see higher returns on FDI compared to firms
from other countries making the same investment. The government may have classified
knowledge about the nation or simply the resources of the government are great enough to
compensate for any risk the firm making the investment will encounter.
Corporate Taxation on FDI inflows
As noted previously, the connection between FDI inflows and politico-economic factors is
evident. However, one crucial component which determines the dollar value of FDI inflows is
corporate taxation. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) notes this robust relationship through 11
OECD countries over 1984-2000, particularly observing high corporate tax rates within a
country discourage FDI inflows, as firms will look to other nations with more favorable tax
laws. Perhaps of more significance, relatively lower tax rates do not help in attracting inward
FDI. Simply, countries who lower their corporate tax rate will not attract FDI inflows, but
countries that raise their corporate tax rate will discourage FDI inflows. Many firms,
predominantly in the United States, end up paying a lower effective tax rate than the statutory
one. Lowering it will yield only limited benefits.
In additional research, Becker et al. (2012) found the quality of FDI inflows are equal in
importance to the quantity of FDI inflows while studying multinational firms in 22 countries
from a time period of 2000-2006. Corporate taxation affects both quality and quantity of FDI.
FDI which targets certain desirable industries will yield increased returns for FDI inflows.
These industries vary among countries, however finding the best industries increases the
quality of the FDI. As for the quantity of FDI, Becker found a 1% increase in corporate tax
rates results in a 1.59% decrease in the quantity of FDI. That elastic relationship suggests the
willingness and capability of firms to invest through FDI elsewhere. Specifically observing
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German firms and their outbound FDI, Overesch and Wamser (2009) discover corporate
taxation has varying effects on FDI when taking into account the industry; some businesses
are much more tax sensitive than others. For example, Overesch and Wamser (2009) mention
financial service subsidiaries are much more tax sensitive compared to the average German
firm because of their high mobility and capability to shift their services to ideal taxation
settings.
Considering the greater EU, Gorter and Parikh (2003) analyze the effects of lower corporate
taxation countries (compared to the average) to high taxation nations in terms of FDI inflows
in the years 1995 and 1996. Their results yield an elasticity of 4%, meaning a 1% decrease in
the corporate taxation rate relative to the EU average, which increases the quantity of inward
FDI to that country by 4%. Inbound FDI is disproportionately distributed to the nations with
low corporate tax rates, which according to Gorter and Parikh (2003), negatively affects
productivity in all countries, reducing the benefits associated with FDI. This is because as
firms move their FDI to countries with lower corporate tax rates, which is possible through
high capital mobility, the nations which they are moving to typically have lower pre-tax
capital productivity. The shift towards low productivity nations due to their lower corporate
tax rates reduces overall productivity within the EU countries considered.
The robust relationship between FDI and corporate taxation is quite evident, as noted above
and by many other articles researching various areas of the globe. Many variables have been
analyzed alongside FDI and corporate taxation, however, there is no research comparing the
correlation when considering government structure of the country receiving FDI. Corporate
taxation is simply one of many factors determining FDI inflows to a country, and many of the
other characteristics are political. A nation’s political environment is often decided by the
type of government established. To categorize the types of government broadly, countries are
either democratic or non-democratic. The type of government which a country operates on
has an unknown relationship with FDI and corporate taxation. Research must be done about
that topic to further identify key determinants in FDI, whether those elements are positive or
negative.
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Connection between FDI and Democracy
While FDI has many determinants, a factor which governs many other elements is democracy
levels. Hence, determining the relationship between FDI inflows and democracy globally will
yield explanations to other variables which will account for FDI. In essence, the structure of a
government inherently decides other FDI determinants (corporate taxation, GNP per capita,
and ease of doing business), as many fall under the control of the government or are heavily
influenced by government decisions. In democracies, the general voting-eligible population
either directly or indirectly determines the policies and regulations in the political sphere and
economy, which in turn impact the amount of FDI inflows. Therefore, if there is a correlation
between democracy rankings and FDI inflows, countries will theoretically attempt to adjust
their governments to align themselves with other democratic nations if they desire to benefit
from increased FDI inflows. Clearly there are several other factors to consider why a country
chooses to be democratic or not, but in the vacuum of FDI inflows, finding the relationship
between the two could truly establish a strong correlation and consequently add another
advantage of democracy as defined above.
A relationship has been established previously. Asiedu and Lien (2011) observe FDI inflows
and democracy through the lens of natural resource exporting, finding the relationship holds
true only if countries export a critical amount of natural resources. Likewise, Busse (2003)
finds a robust connection between democracy and FDI inflows through cross-sectional and
panel data analysis from 1970 – 2000, using developing countries as defined by the World
Bank. Interestingly, these findings both support and refute previous work, where the
correlation tended to vary alongside other variables. An example of this is actually found in
the research Busse (2003) performed, as it was determined the 1970s saw more FDI flowing
to repressive regimes. Since that period, enough opposition and awareness has occurred
against repressive regimes, leading towards FDI in more democratic countries for the rest of
the time period observed.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
Consistent with the existing literature, the hypothesis for this research centers around the
relationship between democracy and FDI inflows. Given the use of three independent
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measures of democracy, the relationship between a countries’ democratic level and FDI
inflows is expected to be positive. Furthermore, the relationship is predicted to be robust
through the different measures of democracy. Democracy is a subjective variable, which
perpetuates the need for multiple calculations. By running an empirical analysis through all
three measures of democracy and FDI inflows, the results, if they are as hypothesized, will be
much stronger.
The reasoning for the hypothesis that countries considered to be democratic by the chosen
measures will receive higher FDI inflows from foreign entities is due to previous research and
the overall economies of democratic nations. Democracy and capitalism have been
intertwined since the introduction of democracy (Almond 1991). A democratic government
promotes economic growth and prosperity through a variety of factors, including its ties to
capitalism, reduced corruption, and more stability from the support of its population. The
endorsement allows for ample opportunity for high returns on investment, both domestic and
foreign investors. Therefore, entities choose to invest where they anticipate a high rate of
return when adjusting for risk, with many of those chances coming in democratic nations due
to the advocacy of economic growth. Therefore, the relationship between democracy and FDI
inflows may also extend to a strong relationship between FDI inflows and capitalism,
although only the preceding will be analyzed. That leaves more possible research to be
performed.

METHOD
An empirical analysis determining the relationship between FDI inflows for upper-middle
income countries and democracy was conducted. To ensure the subjectivity of the variable is
reduced as much as it can and aid the robustness of the analysis, a multiple regression analysis
is performed to investigate the relationship between FDI inflows and democracy, using three
measures of democracy.
Sample
The initial sample was the 56 countries classified by the World Bank as upper-middle income,
which means the gross national income (GNI) per capita is between $4,046 and $12,535.
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However, due to missing data points, particularly smaller countries, only 39 countries were
used in the final analysis. These countries were chosen as a sample because of the variety in
democratic rankings. Data is also widely available for most of these nations, whereas other
groups of countries, particularly those considered low-income by the World Bank, are missing
significant points of data. In addition, those considered low income show little variation in
terms of democracy rankings across many sources, which would provide little information on
FDI inflows and democratic rating. Likewise, for high-income nations, most tend to be rather
democratic, again skewing results and not providing enough information on non-democratic
nations according to the selected democracy indexes.
The time range researched was limited by the democracy information available. The
Economist Intelligence Unit, which publishes the yearly Democracy Index, has only done so
since 2006 and does not have data points for 2007 and 2009. On the other hand, Polity5, the
updated version of PolityIV, only has information up to 2018 for most countries. Therefore,
the timeframe between 2010 and 2018 was used for analysis to ensure each country has all
available information and there is no data bias.
The two primary variables for the present study are FDI inflows and democracy, where FDI
inflows is the dependent variable and democracy serves as the independent variable. Other
controlling variables, comprising of GNI per capita, average years of schooling, inflation,
ease of doing business, financial system complexity, and the corporate tax rate. FDI is defined
by Duce (2003) as the investment of a lasting interest by an entity in one economy to an
enterprise situated in another economy. Inflows simply refer to the country receiving the FDI
as opposed to making the outward investment. FDI inflows will be determined within the
analysis as FDI inflows per capita, which is used as a measure by Nunnenkamp (2002) and
Busse (2003). Democracy is measured using several different indicators. For example, Asiedu
and Lien (2011) use three unique measures of democracy (free, polity, and icrg) from three
different sources (Freedom House, Polity IV, and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)).
Yang (2007) uses Polity IV and PACL as democracy measures. Democracy is a subjective
measure, as there are no defined standards which countries must meet to be classified as
democratic. Therefore, as previous research has, using more than one measure of democracy
is vital towards establishing a strong correlation. To both account for the variance between
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democracy rankings and ensure robustness of the analysis, three separate regressions were
performed, with each measure of democracy being run in a different regression.

DATA
The data being used in this empirical analysis consisted of three main categories: data
determining FDI inflows, democracy rankings, and control variables. Data referring to FDI
inflows per capita and other economic data being used as control variables was obtained from
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), specifically the
International Data & Economic Analysis (IDEA). USAID is a reliable institution, publishing
in-depth economic statistics for every country in the world. As for measures of democracy,
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index, Polity5, and the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s (IDEA) Global State of Democracy
Indices will be used to determine democracy in each of the 39 countries. The EIU uses five
categories (electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political
participation, and political culture), which 60 total questions are answered by experts and
public opinion surveys, then each category is assessed a score 0 – 10. The final score is a
simple average of the five categories.
Polity5 is a score between -10 and +10 which considers six component measures including
executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. It codifies
all this information and provides breakdowns on individual scores for each “major country”
(countries with constant populations over 500,000). Lastly, IDEA combines several existing
data sets from reputable sources, all containing different types of data points (expert surveys,
in-house coding, observational data, and composite measures).
FDI per capita, as the dependent variable, is transformed into logarithmic form, consistent
with prior literature and due to the skewness of the data.
In addition to FDI per capita and democracy ratings, there are several other control variables
on each country and year to understand the full extent of the relationship. These variables
include corporate tax percentage, GNI per capita (in constant 2015 USD), consumer price
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inflation percentage, average schooling years, ease of doing business 1, and financial
development 2. Table 1 summarizes the variables used in the analysis. Due to the manner the
World Bank calculates FDI inflows, negative numbers are possible and are corrected for
regressions.
Table 1 – Summary Statistics

Model
There will be three separate models which have the same variables, except each has a
different democratic rating. The model is shown below.
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

= 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝜀𝜀

Ease of doing business is a simple average of the following statistics: starting a business, dealing with
construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors,
paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency.
2
Financial development is a simple average of depth, access, efficiency for both financial institutions and
financial markets.
1
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Where DEM is the democracy ranking, CIT is corporate taxation percentage, lnGNIcapita is
the logarithmic transformation of GNI per capita , Inflation is consumer price inflation,
School is average years of schooling, FIN is financial development, and lnFDIcapita is the
logarithmic transformation of FDI per capita. This model appropriately captures the control
variables established in prior literature.

RESULTS
To examine the data, a panel regression was run using fixed effects, random effects, and a
Hausman test to determine the appropriate model to observe the results. Panel regression was
used due to the yearly basis of the data, as each of the 39 countries have 9 years of data, from
2010 to 2018 associated with them. Separate regressions were run for each measure of
democracy for robustness purposes. Both random effects and fixed effects regressions were
run, then Hausman tests to determine the proper model for each measure of democracy.
Due to the Hausman Tests (Appendices A, B, and C) indicating random effects are
appropriate, only random effects models are included in the main body of the paper. In
addition, FDI inflows were regressed incrementally, first against exclusively the democracy
measure, then against the democracy variable and only objective economic variables, then
finally against all variables. Hence, for each democracy measure, there are three separate
regressions, progressively ordered. For all regressions, time fixed effects were utilized to
account for the differences between years. Therefore, the regressions which the results and
conclusions are derived from include these random effects and time fixed effects.
Table 2 – EIU Democracy Results
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The first democracy measure tested was the EIU democracy rating. The coefficient is
statistically insignificant once all control variables are included. The EIU democracy variable
is significant at the 1% level when no covariates are added, however it becomes less
statistically significant as more control variables are added. This implies that EIU democracy
is not the best indicator for FDI inflows per capita. Many of the other control variables
ultimately are statistically insignificant, with only GNI per capita being significant at the 1%
level and financial development being significant on the 10% level, with a negative
coefficient.
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When the EIU democracy rating is statistically significant, it has a positive relationship with
FDI inflows. However as more covariates are added, it is evident this relationship comes from
GNI per capita, which despite a relatively weak correlation between the democracy rating and
income. The GNI per capita coefficient indicates a 1% increase in GNI predicts a 1.22%
increase in FDI inflows, a significant number.
Table 3 – IDEA Democracy Results

The coefficient for IDEA democracy ratings is insignificant for the final regression. This
holds true for the regressions run with control variables, however not for the first regression,
where IDEA ratings are the only independent variable. Similar to EIU democracy ratings,
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IDEA democracy ratings are statistically significant at the 1% when no control variables are
introduced, however this significance disappears as more control variables are introduced
incrementally. Like EIU, the only statistically significant variables when all control variables
are included are GNI per capita at the 1% level and Financial Complexity at the 10% level.
Regardless of the democracy coefficient, GNI per capita and Financial Complexity maintain
their significance and similar coefficients from the EIU democracy results, with Financial
Complexity having a negative coefficient. The negative coefficient implies a more developed
financial system reduces the FDI inflows for a given country, contradicting prior research.
This coefficient is only significant on the 10% level.
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Table 4 – Polity5 Democracy Results

The Polity5 regressions have the least statistical significance, as the only statistically
significant variables out of the three regressions are again GNI per capita and Financial
Complexity, when all control variables are included. The statistical significance of the Polity5
variable is eroded, much like EIU and IDEA, when control variables are added to the
regression, suggesting a correlation with the existing control variables. Contrary to EIU and
IDEA, Polity5 is never considered a statistically significant variable in any of the incremental
regressions. GNI per capita and Financial Complexity maintain their coefficient signs from
the previous democracy rankings.
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After incorporating all the control variables, no measure of democracy determined to be
statistically significant. This insignificance does not hold true for all variables, where GNI per
capita is found to be statistically significant for not only all measures of democracy, but also
across all the incremental regressions run, all at the 1% level. The significance signifies GNI
per capita is a robust indicator of FDI inflows for a country, to a greater extent than any other
variable included in the analysis. Furthermore, Financial Complexity is determined to be
significant at the 10% level across all three democracy measures with a negative coefficient,
suggesting there may be a link between FDI inflows and countries with financial systems that
require external investment.

CONCLUSION
There is no significant and robust relationship between FDI inflows and democracy ratings,
despite an initial hypothesis and prior literature suggesting a correlation. Instead, GNI per
capita is found to be a significant variable with all democracy measures and also in every
incremental regression. It should be noted that for EIU and IDEA, democracy was found to be
a statistically significant variable at the 1% when no other covariates were regressed.
Furthermore, when EIU and IDEA were statistically significant, each had a different
coefficient sign, signifying the inability of democracy to predict FDI inflows and the inherent
subjectivity of creating a variable to measure the democracy levels in a country.
Unexpectedly, GNI per capita was significant in all regressions. The positive coefficient
clashes with traditional economic theory which states that capital will flow to where capital
stock is low, which tends to be lower income countries. A positive coefficient implies capital
(in the form of FDI) is going to countries that currently have domestic wealth and therefore do
not require the same level of foreign investment as lower income nations. This creates a cycle
where entities choose to invest in established economies (in terms of income), creating more
wealth, while poorer countries are unable to attract the investment needed to accumulate
domestic wealth and have no viable path to obtaining needed capital. One reason for this is
entities may choose to invest where a desired return on investment carries less risk than
investing in a less developed nation, where the income levels are lower.
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In addition to GNI per capita, Financial Complexity was found to be significant and negative,
where less developed financial systems are predicted to receive more FDI inflows. This could
be a result of investors attempting to achieve greater returns on investment through increasing
risk. Investment risk is more likely to be present in countries where financial systems and the
overall economy is not as developed.
Countries should focus on creating domestic wealth and income, as that in turn will attract
FDI without the need to market or provide tax incentives to companies who decide to invest.
Creating domestic wealth is difficult and limits the ability of nations to adjust themselves to
attract higher levels of FDI if desired. The income of a country is a better predictor of FDI
than democracy. Further research in this area should be focused on discovering more FDI
determinants that focus on more subjective variables, such as democracy or ease of business.
This will allow for countries to further understand the drivers of FDI and take proactive steps
to achieve higher levels of FDI, if it is desired within the country.
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Appendix A – Hausman Test for EIU Democracy Ratings
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Appendix C – Hausman Test for Polity5 Democracy Ratings
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Appendix D – EIU Democracy Rating Random Effects Results
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Appendix E – IDEA Democracy Ratings Random Effects Results
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Appendix F – Polity5 Democracy Ratings Random Effects Results
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Appendix G – EIU Democracy Ratings Fixed Effects and Time Fixed Effects Results
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